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Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors, and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is pop-
ular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance
is also at the heart of predator-prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth
of marine sessile organisms, and the competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge
spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when
the competing strategies are three or more regardless of the particularities of the game. Here we review recent
advances on the rock-paper-scissors and related evolutionary games, focusing in particular on pattern formation,
the impact of mobility, and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and
zero-dimensional rock-paper-scissors models and the application of the complex Ginzburg-Landau equation,
and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale eco-
logical systems. Directions for future research, related for example to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules
and invasion reversals due to multi-point interactions, are outlined as well.
Keywords: cyclical interactions, pattern formation, phase transitions, mobility, coevolution, complex Ginzburg-Landau equa-
tion, self-organization
I. INTRODUCTION
Games of cyclic dominance play a prominent role in ex-
plaining the intriguing biodiversity in nature [1–3], and they
are also able to provide insights into Darwinian selection [4],
as well as into structural complexity [5] and prebiotic evolu-
tion [6]. Cyclical interactions have been observed in different
ecological systems. Examples include marine benthic systems
[7], plant systems [8–12], and microbial populations [2, 13–
16]. Cyclic dominance also plays an important role in the
mating strategy of side-blotched lizards [17], the overgrowth
of marine sessile organisms [18], the genetic regulation in the
repressilator [19], and in explaining the oscillating frequency
of lemmings [20] and of the Pacific salmon [21]. The list of
examples where the puzzle of biological diversity can be ex-
plained by the interaction topology of the food web among
those who struggle for life is indeed impressively long and
inspiring [22, 23].
In addition to the closed loops of dominance in the food
webs that govern the evolution of competing species and
strategies, experiments have shown that the key to the sus-
tenance of biodiversity is often spatial structure. In vitro ex-
periments with Escherichia coli, for example, have shown that
arranging the bacteria on a Petri dish is crucial for keeping all
three competing strands alive [2, 24, 25]. On the other hand,
in vivo experiments with bacterial colonies in the intestines
of co-caged mice, which can be considered as locally well-
mixed populations, have revealed that mobility alone is suffi-
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cient to maintain coexistence [14]. Solely because the bacteria
were able to migrate from one mice to another, the biodiver-
sity was preserved. Motivated by such intriguing experimental
observations, theoretical explorations of the relevance of spa-
tial structure in evolutionary games have also received ample
attention in the recent past [26–31].
The importance of spatial structure has been put into the
spotlight by the discovery that interaction networks like the
square lattice can promote the evolution of cooperation in
the prisoner’s dilemma game through the mechanism that is
now known as network reciprocity [32, 33]. In essence, net-
work reciprocity relies on the fact that cooperators do best if
they are surrounded by other cooperators. More generally, the
study of spatial games has revealed the need for realistic mod-
els to go beyond well-mixed populations [34–36]. To under-
stand the fascinating diversity in nature and to reveal the many
hidden mechanisms that sustain it, we cannot avoid the com-
plexity of such systems. Cyclical interactions are character-
ized by the presence of strong fluctuations, unpredictable and
nonlinear dynamics, multiple scales of space and time, and
frequently also some form of emergent structure. Since many
of these properties are inherent also to problems of nonequi-
librium statistical physics, theoretical research on spatial rock-
paper-scissors (RPS) and related games of cyclic dominance
has a long and fruitful history [37–65], much of which is
firmly rooted in methods of statistical physics that can inform
relevantly on the outcome of evolutionary games on structured
populations.
Cyclical interactions are in many ways the culmination
of evolutionary complexity, and they may also arise sponta-
neously in evolutionary games where the number of compet-
ing strategies is three or more. For example, cyclic dominance
has been observed in public goods games with volunteering
[68, 69], peer punishment [35, 68, 70, 71], pool punishment
[72, 73] and reward [74–76], but also in pairwise social dilem-
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FIG. 1: Examples of food webs of competing strategies. The number of competing strategies and the topological complexity of the food
web increases from left to right, and so does the complexity and number of possible stable solutions: (a) The traditional RPS food web.
Here rock (R) is wrapped by paper, paper (P) is cut by scissors, and scissors (S) are broken by a rock. (b) Four-strategy food web with
different invasion rates between predator-prey pairs, which already supports the emergence of defensive alliances [66]. (c) Six-species food
web with heterogeneous invasion rates, supporting a multitude of different defensive alliances as well as noise-guided evolution [67]. (d)
Topologically complex food web describing bacterial warfare with two toxins. Here nine different strains compete, giving rise to a multitude
of stable solutions that amaze with their complexity and beauty [44]. Three-strategy alliances that can successfully avert an external invasion
are denoted by broken colored lines.
mas with coevolution [77, 78] or with jokers [79]. Counterin-
tuitive complex phenomena that are due to cyclic dominance
include the survival of the weakest [41, 49], the emergence
of labyrinthine clustering [64], and the segregation along in-
terfaces that have internal structure [80], to name but a few
examples. Importantly, the complexity of solutions increases
further and fast if the competing strategies are more than three.
Figure 1 depicts a transition towards more and more complex
food webs from left to right, which support the formation of
defensive alliances [81] and subsystem solutions [82] that are
not possible in the simplest RPS game.
Although the outcome of evolutionary games with cyclic
dominance may depend on the properties of the interaction
network, the topology of the food web, and on the number
of competing strategies, there nevertheless exists fascinatingly
robust universal behavior that is independent of model partic-
ularities. While we may have only begun to scratch the sur-
face of the actual importance of cyclic dominance in nature
[83, 84], the time is ripe for a survey of theoretical advances
that may guide future experimental efforts. Like by the evolu-
tion of cooperation [85], in games of cyclic dominance too the
evolutionary game theory [86–90] is proving to be the theory
of choice for the study of these beautifully simple yet fasci-
nating systems.
The organization of this review is as follows. In Section II
we focus on mean-field and zero-dimensional RPS models to
give a comprehensive prologue to the overview of the spatial
RPS game in Section III. Within the latter, we separately re-
view the impact of different interaction networks and mobility,
and we describe the derivation and the proper use of the com-
plex Ginzburg-Landau equation to describe the spatiotempo-
ral properties and the stability of the spiraling patterns. In
Section IV, we depart from the RPS game where the cyclic
dominance is explicitly encoded in the food web by consider-
ing social dilemmas and other evolutionary games. We sepa-
rately review games where cyclical interactions emerge spon-
taneously, the role of time-dependent interactions, the impact
of voluntary participation, and we survey evolutionary games
where an alliance between two strategies acts as an additional
independent strategy. From there, we focus on cyclical in-
teraction between four and more competing strategies, which
opens the door towards reviewing the emergence of defensive
alliances and large networks of competitive species. We con-
clude with a summary and an outlook towards promising fu-
ture research efforts.
II. CYCLIC DOMINANCE IN WELL-MIXED SYSTEMS
While the emphasis of this review is on cyclic dominance
in structured populations, it is useful to start by considering
the simplest setting to study RPS games which is the mean
field limit of well-mixed populations where all individuals can
interact with each other.
A generic RPS game between individuals of three species,
A, B andC, in a population of total sizeN entails cyclic com-
petition and reproduction according to the following reaction
schemes:
AB
p−→ A∅ , BC p−→ B∅ , CA p−→ C∅, (1)
AB
z−→ AA , BC z−→ BB , CA z−→ CC, (2)
A∅ q−→ AA , B∅ q−→ BB , C∅ q−→ CC, (3)
where the reactions (1) and (2) describe two forms of cyclic
dominance of species A over B, B over C, and in turn C
over A and (3) accounts for reproduction into an empty space
(denoted by ∅) with a rate q, see e.g. [28, 46, 91]. The re-
action given by Eq. (1) corresponds to one species dominat-
ing and displacing another (dominance-removal) with rate p,
3whereas in Eq. (2) there is a zero-sum dominance-replacement
with rate z. Recent experiments have shown that in addition
to cyclic dominance, some species can mutate. For instance,
E. coli bacteria are known to mutate [2], and it was found that
the side-blotched lizards Uta stansburiana are not only en-
gaged in cyclic competition, but they can also undergo throat
colour transformations [92]. It is therefore also instructive
to assume that each species can mutate into one of the other
species with a rate µ [53, 91], according to
A
µ−→
{
B
C
, B
µ−→
{
A
C
, C
µ−→
{
A
B
. (4)
Additional evolutionary processes that should be specified are
those encoding the movement of individuals. However, these
are irrelevant in the absence of spatial structure and will there-
fore be introduced in the next section. In the mean field limit
of population sizeN →∞, the dynamics of the system evolv-
ing according to Eqs. (1)-(4) is aptly described by the follow-
ing rate equations for the densities a(t) of A’s, b(t) ofB’s and
c(t) of C’s:
da
dt
= a [qρ∅ + z(b− c)− pc] + µ(b+ c− 2a)
db
dt
= b [qρ∅ + z(c− a)− pa] + µ(a+ c− 2b) (5)
dc
dt
= c [qρ∅ + z(a− b)− pb] + µ(a+ b− 2c),
where ρ∅ = 1− (a+b+c) denotes the density of empty sites.
These rate equations admit a steady state s∗ = (a∗, b∗, c∗) in
which A,B and C coexist at the same density a∗ = b∗ =
c∗ = q
p+3q encompass three types of oscillatory dynamics:
(i) When p, q > 0, z ≥ 0 and µ = 0, the Eqs. (5) can
be rewritten as the rate equations of the May-Leonard
model [93]. In this case, the above coexistence state is
unstable and there are also three absorbing stationary
states corresponding to the population being composed
of only A, B or C. As in the May-Leonard model, the
dynamics is characterized by heteroclinic cycles con-
necting these three absorbing states, with the population
being composed almost exclusively of eitherA, B orC,
in turn. It is worth noting that the heteroclinic cycles are
degenerate when z = 0 [93].
(ii) When p, q > 0, z ≥ 0 and µ > 0, a supercriti-
cal Hopf bifurcation arises at the value µ = µH =
pq/(6(p + 3q)) of the bifurcation parameter: the co-
existence steady state is a stable focus when µ > µH ,
while it is unstable when µ < µH and the dynamics is
thus characterized by a stable limit cycle of frequency
ωH ≈
√
3q(p+ 2z)/[2(p+ 3q)] [53, 91].
(iii) When z > 0 and p = q = µ = 0, the state ∅ plays no
role in the dynamics and one recovers the cyclic Lotka-
volterra model [39, 94]. The sum and product of the
densities, a(t) + b(t) + c(t) and a(t)b(t)c(t), are con-
served by (5) which results in nested neutrally stable
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FIG. 2: Phase portrait of the RPS dynamics with asymmetric
dominance-replacement rates zA = 2, zB = 1, zC = 1.5 in a
well-mixed population. The mean field rate equations predict closed
orbits, here shown in black solid lines. Their linearization around the
neutrally stable coexistence steady state s∗ = (2/9, 1/3, 4/9) trans-
form the orbits into circles in the coordinates yA, yB (blue). The red
flow that erratically spirals out from the coexistence fixed point is a
single trajectory obtained by simulating the stochastic dynamics in a
finite population of size N = 200. This illustrates how demographic
fluctuations are responsible for the extinction of two species (here A
and C) after a time of order N . See the main text for details, as well
as [42], from where this figure is adapted.
closed orbits around the coexistence fixed point which
is a neutrally stable center [95]. It is worth noting that
the cyclic dominance-replacement scheme with asym-
metric ratesAB zA−→ AA , BC zB−→ BB , CA zC−→
CC is also characterized by a marginally stable coex-
istence fixed point s∗ = 1
zA+zB+zC
(zB, zC , zA) sur-
rounded by neutrally stable orbits on which the mean
field dynamics takes place, see Fig. 2 [42, 50].
The evolution in well-mixed populations of finite size, N <
∞ is usually described in terms of birth-and-death Markov
chains, see e.g. [96]. In this case, the interactions between a
finite number of discrete individuals lead to fluctuations that
may drastically affect the dynamics. In particular, in the pres-
ence of absorbing states, fluctuations are responsible for the
extinction of two strategies and the fixation of the surviving
one, see Fig. 2 [42, 50]. Questions concerning the mean time
necessary for two species to go extinct and the probability that
one specific strategy survives have recently attracted signifi-
cant attention and were mostly addressed by means of stochas-
tic simulations. These are often efficiently carried out using
the Gillespie algorithm [97]: for instance, cyclic competition
and reproduction according to Eqs. (1)-(3) are implemented
by allowing at each time increment a reproduction event with
probability q/(p + q + z), a dominance displacement move
with probability p/(p+ q + z) and a dominance replacement
update with probability z/(p+q+z). When p > 0 and µ = 0
and the mean field dynamics is characterized by heteroclinic
cycles, the mean extinction time has been found to be of or-
derO(N). The existence of quantities conserved by the mean
4field dynamics allows some analytical progress in the case of
cyclic dominance with replacement (p = q = µ = 0) for
which it was shown that two species die out after a mean time
that scales linearly with the system size N [42, 98, 99]. In this
class of models with asymmetric rates, it was also shown the
survival probability follows an intriguing “law of the weak-
est”: the strategy with the smallest dominance rate is the most
likely to survive and to fixate the population [41, 49], as il-
lustrated in Fig. 2. Some other aspects of extinction in RPS
games in finite and well-mixed populations have been con-
sidered in Ref. [100, 101] and studied in further details in
Ref. [102].
III. ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS GAME IN STRUCTURED
POPULATIONS
In a structured population, or alternatively, in a spatial sys-
tem, the interactions between players are defined by an inter-
action network and are thus limited. Because players have
only limited interactions with their neighbors, a strategy (or
species) will not necessarily meet its superior (or predator).
This restriction has far-reaching consequences, because it en-
ables pattern formation, and through that the survival of all
three competing strategies with a time-dependent frequency
akin to the Red Queen [103–105]. For example, it is possible
to observe propagating fronts and spiral waves between the
competing strategies [40, 47, 91], which are particularly fas-
cinating and complex if the invasion rates between different
pairs of strategies are significantly different [64]. In general,
self-sustained oscillations of all three strategies are possible in
spatially homogeneous populations [106, 107] and result from
periodic dynamics around a long-lived metastable coexistence
state whose life time is determined by the system size (or the
size of the population) [108, 109]. Hence, if the system size is
sufficiently large all possible combinations of invasion fronts
appear, resulting in a time-independent constant frequency of
strategies, depending only on the invasion rates between the
three competing strategies.
In comparison to a well-mixed population, a spatial sys-
tem allows us to introduce an additional microscopic process
that has no effect if everybody interacts with everybody else,
namely site exchange between strategies or between an indi-
vidual player and an empty site. This gives rise to mobil-
ity, which arguably has a profound impact on the outcome of
the RPS game as it can both promote and impede biodiversity
[3]. In contrast to well-mixed systems, where as seen intrinsic
noise can jeopardize the coexistence of species [42], depend-
ing on the level of mobility, species coexistence can be more
easily maintained than under well-mixed conditions [3, 45]
and stochastic effects can have counterintuitive effects at some
bifurcation point be reduced by stable patterns in spatial sys-
tems [46].
The mentioned mixing of strategies (directly or via empty
sites) can also influence the cyclic competition in aquatic me-
dia [110]. Furthermore, the degree of mixing determines the
way of extinction, like the annihilation of domains, hetero-
clinic orbits, or traveling waves in a finite system [111]. The
RPS game can also be regarded as a cyclical Lotka-Volterra
model, and indeed it has been shown that a two-species Lotka-
Volterra system with empty cites can give rise to global oscil-
lations [112]. In general, however, it is important to acknowl-
edge that the structure of the interaction network and mobility
can both have a significant impact on the evolutionary out-
come of cyclical interactions, and in the following subsections
we review this in more detail, as well as survey the usefulness
of the complex Ginzburg-Landau equation.
A. Interaction networks
In a structured population species should contact in real-
space and their interaction is characterized by an appropriate
graph. Lattices are the simplest among these interaction net-
works, where every player has the same number of neighbors.
By far the most widely used is the square lattice, although
alternatives such as the honeycomb lattice, the triangular lat-
tice, and the kagome´ lattice are frequently employed as well
to study the relevance of the degree of players and the role of
clustering. While the square and the honeycomb lattice both
have the clustering coefficient C equal to zero, the kagome´ and
the triangular lattice both feature percolating overlapping tri-
angles, such that their clustering coefficient is C = 1/3 and
C = 2/5, respectively. In general, lattices can be regarded as
an even field for all competing strategies where the possibil-
ity of network reciprocity is given [32]. Furthermore, as there
are many different types of lattices, it is possible to focus on
very specific properties of cyclical interactions and test what
is their role in the evolutionary process. In some cases, like by
the competition of bacteria [2, 16, 28, 113, 114] or for the de-
scription of parasite-grass-forb interactions [12], lattices are
also an apt approximation of the actual interaction network.
In more complex systems, however, the description of inter-
actions requires the usage more intricate networks, which typ-
ically have broad-scale degree distribution and small-world
properties [115, 116]. The question how the topology of the
interaction network affects the outcome of cyclical interac-
tion, and game theoretical models in general [26, 27, 29, 31],
is one of great interest.
As an initial departure from lattices towards more complex
interaction topologies, it is possible to consider networks with
dispersed degrees. As demonstrated by Masuda and Konno,
the resulting heterogeneity can help to maintain the stable co-
existence of species in cyclic competition [120]. Another pos-
sibility is to introduce permanent shortcut links that connect
distant players, thereby effectively introducing small-world
properties. In contrast to lattices, on small-world networks the
frequencies of competing strategies oscillate even in the large
system size limit, as shown [118, 121–123]. The explanation
behind this observation lies in the fact that the introduction
of shortcuts introduces quenched randomness into the inter-
action network. If the magnitude of this randomness exceeds
a threshold value, i.e., if the number of shortcut links is suf-
ficiently large, the amplitude of frequency oscillations can be
so large that the system will always terminate into an absorb-
ing state during the evolutionary process. These results lead to
50
1
p=0.2
[P
]
p=0.3
0 600
0
1
p=0.4
time
[P
]
0 600
p=0.8
time
[S]
[P]
[R]
FIG. 3: Transitions between “stationary → oscillatory → absorb-
ing → stationary” phases in a coevolutionary RPS game where an
invaded player can severe the link towards its predator with a proba-
bility P . For further details we refer to [117]. The reported nonequi-
librium phase transitions are qualitatively similar as those observed
on interaction networks with annealed randomness [118], as well as
those observed in coevolutionary social dilemma games [77, 119].
The emergence of oscillatory behavior akin to the Red Queen thus
appears to be a robust phenomenon on coevolving networks.
the conclusion that not only the limited interaction range that
is imposed by structured populations, but even more so the
explicit spatial distribution of competing species is the crucial
property that determines coexistence and biodiversity [124].
This observation becomes particularly interesting if we com-
pare it with the observations made in the realm of spatial so-
cial dilemma games, where the limited interaction range was
found to be the decisive factor for the promotion of coopera-
tion based on network reciprocity [26, 33].
Properties that are typical of small worlds can be introduced
not only by means of permanent shortcut links between dis-
tant players, but also by means of temporary long-range links
that replace nearest-neighbor links with probability P . This
process is typically referred to as annealed randomness [118].
But while topological properties of annealed and quenched
small worlds may be very similar, there is a relevant difference
in the evolutionary outcomes of cyclical interactions taking
place on them. Namely, annealed randomness no longer gives
rise to oscillatory frequencies of the three competing strate-
gies in the RPS game. For sufficiently large values of P , the
oscillations are replaced by steady state behavior [125], as is
commonly observed on regular lattices. Interestingly, similar
results were also reported for a four-strategy cyclic dominance
game in [126]. But as we will review later, the transitions be-
tween stationary and oscillatory states in cyclical interactions
can in fact be driven by many different mechanisms, even if
the interaction network thereby remains unchanged.
The topology of the interaction network may also change
as a result of a particular coevolutionary rule, as studied fre-
quently before in the realm of social dilemma games. Note
that when not only individual strategy but also other player-
specific character (such as connectivity, strategy adopting- or
passing capacity, etc.) may change in time then we can ob-
serve parallel evolutions, co-evolution of strategies and other
quantities, see [29] for a review. In particular, rewiring could
be the consequence of invasions between strategies [77, 119].
Although games of cyclic dominance received comparatively
little attention in this respect, there is a study by Demirel et
al. [117], which builds exactly on this premise. Namely, the
loser of each particular instance of the game can either adopt
the winning strategy (an invasion occurs), or it can rewire the
link that brought the defeat. It was shown that nonequilibrium
phase transitions occur as a function of the rewiring strength,
as illustrated in Fig. 3. The observation of the “stationary
→ oscillatory → absorbing → stationary” phase transitions
is conceptually similar to those observed in the realm of inter-
action networks with annealed randomness. In general, it is
thus possible to conclude that oscillatory behavior in coevolv-
ing networks is a robust phenomenon — a conclusion which is
further corroborated by agent-based simulations showing that
coevolving networks can influence the cycling of host social-
ity and pathogen virulence [127].
B. Mobility
As briefly explained above, besides the properties of the in-
teraction network, mobility, as is the case in general for evo-
lutionary game theoretical models [128–132], can also play
a decisive role in the maintenance of biodiversity in games
of cyclic dominance. The consideration of mobility has both
theoretical and practical aspects. Theoretically, the question
is whether mobility affects the stability of spatial patterns that
typically emerge in structured populations, and if yes, how?
From the practical point of view, it is important to acknowl-
edge the fact that in real life prey and predators are frequently
on the move in order to maximize their chances of survival.
Accordingly, their neighborhoods change, which is in agree-
ment with the effect that is brought about by mobility in simu-
lations. The crucial point to clarify is whether mobility simply
shifts the evolutionary outcomes towards those observed in
well-mixed populations, or whether there emerge unexpected
phenomena that disagree with mean-field predictions. As we
will review in what follows, the introduction of mobility in
structured populations is certainly much more than simply a
transition towards well-mixed conditions.
Pioneering work on the subject has been done by Reichen-
6FIG. 4: Typical spatial patterns, which emerge spontaneously from
random initial conditions on a square lattice. Top panel illustrates
how the characteristic length scale of spiral waves increases with in-
creasing mobility m from left to right. Here the competition and
reproduction rate are both p = q = 1. Bottom panel shows the re-
verse transition, where the characteristic length scale of spiral waves
decreases as the competition rate p increases from left to right. Here
the mobility m = 10−4 and the reproduction rate q = 1.0 are fixed.
Colors red, blue and green denote rock (species A), paper (species
B) and scissor (species C), respectively. Empty sites are gray and
denoted by
⊗
. The system size is N = 5122. For further simula-
tion details we refer to [135].
bach et al. [3, 133], who showed that mobility (or migration)
has a critical impact on biodiversity. In particular, small mo-
bility that is below a critical threshold promotes species co-
existence, while large mobility that is above the threshold
destroys biodiversity. Behind these observations are sponta-
neously emerging spiral patterns, which in general sustain the
coexistence of all three competing strategies [40, 134]. Under
the influence of mobility, however, the spirals grow in size,
and above the critical threshold, they outgrow the system size
causing the loss of biodiversity. Accordingly, in [3] it was thus
argued that mobility can both promote and jeopardize biodi-
versity in RPS games.
As most studies on this subject, in this section we will fo-
cus on RPS games on two-dimensional square lattices of total
size N (here, linear size is
√
N ). The population’s compo-
sition changes according to the dominance-removal reactions
given by Eq. (1) and reproduction reactions given by Eq. (3)
(i.e. q, p > 0 and z = µ = 0, which yields degenerate hetero-
clinic cycles at mean field level; see Sec. II). Furthermore, it is
assumed that individuals can move by swapping their position
with any neighbor at rate γ according to the scheme
XY
γ−→ Y X
X∅ γ−→ ∅X, (6)
where X,Y ∈ (A,B,C). In many references, mobility is
measured in continuum limit by introducing the mobility or
diffusion coefficient m = 2γ/N where N is the system size,
see e.g. [3].
FIG. 5: Disintegration of single-armed spiral waves as the competi-
tion rate p increases past the critical values pc. Depicted are typ-
ical spatial patterns that emerge from a prepared initial state (see
Fig. 2 in [135] for details) for different values of p (see legend). The
top row depicts results obtained with Monte Carlo simulations for
m = 5.0 × 10−5 and q = 1, while the bottom row depicts results
obtained with partial differential equations describing the spatial RPS
game (see Eq. (7)) for Dm = 5.0 × 10−5 and q = 1. Disordered
spatial patterns emerge as soon as p > pc = 2.3. Colors red, blue
and green denote rock (species A), paper (species B) and scissor
(species C), respectively. Empty sites are gray and denoted by ⊗.
For further simulation details we refer to [135].
To focus on the effects of mobility m on pattern formation
and biodiversity, the rate of competition p and reproduction
q can initially be set fixed at 1. Starting from random initial
conditions where each lattice site is with equal probability ei-
ther occupied by rock A, paper B, scissor C or left empty,
we find that the emerging spatial patterns depend sensitively
on mobility. As shown in the top row of Fig. 4, as mobility
increases from left to right, the characteristic scale of spiral
waves increases as well. It was found that at a critical value
of mobility, m = mc = (4.5 ± 0.5) × 10−4 for p = q = 1,
the length scale of the spiralling patterns outgrows the system
size resulting in two species dying out and the dynamics set-
tling in the absorbing of the remaining species [45–47, 136].
The diversity is lost, whereby the extinction probability is de-
fined as the disappearance of two species after a waiting time
that is proportional with the system size. As the system size
increases, this probability approaches zero if m < mc, and it
tends to 1 if m > mc.
In contrast to mobility, competition promotes coexistence
of species because the typical length of the spatial patterns
decreases with increasing competition rate p. This is illus-
trated in the bottom row of Fig. 4 from left to right. Macro-
scopic spiral waves emerge at p = 0.1, but they become
smaller and fragmented as p increases. The fragmentation is
due to the fact that large competition rates introduce empty
sites around small patches that contain all three competing
strategies (i.e. at the spiral core), which in turn leads to the
disintegration of macroscopic spirals typically observed away
7FIG. 6: Beautiful examples of multi-armed spirals with two, three
and four arms (top row from left to right), as well as anti-spirals
with one, two, and three pairs (bottom row from left to right pan-
els). Special initial conditions have been used, which may provide
further insight with regards to the robustness of biodiversity against
mobility. Colors red, blue, green and gray denote rock (species A),
paper (species B), scissor (species C) and empty sites, respectively,
like in Figs. 4 and 5. Here the mobility rate is m = 6.0× 10−5 and
the system size is N = 5122. For further simulation details and the
special conditions we refer to [57].
from the core. The diversity is therefore favored at larger val-
ues of p, as they effectively prevent the spirals outgrowing the
system size. Similar phenomenon can also be observed in the
generic metapopulation model. In the latter case, however, the
fragmentation is a consequence of the meeting of spiral fronts,
as illustrated Fig. 8 [91, 137].
Since pattern formation obviously plays a critical role in
warranting the coexistence of the three competing strategies,
it is particularly important to understand how the spatial pat-
terns evolve. Prepared initial conditions are strongly recom-
mended in such cases, as they can help identify critical pro-
cesses that may either enhance or destroy the stability of co-
existence. The emergence of spirals can be engineered if the
evolution is initiated from three roundish areas, each holding a
particular strategy, while the rest of the lattice is empty [138].
Based on such a procedure, it has been shown that there ex-
ists a critical competition rate pc below which single-armed
spirals in finite populations are stable. For p > pc the spirals
break up and form disordered spatial structures because too
many empty sites allow the emergence of competing mini spi-
rals [135]. This transition is demonstrated in the top row of
Fig. 5 from left to right.
Although Monte Carlo simulations are applied most fre-
quently for studying spatial evolutionary games (see reviews
[26] and [31] for details, and [91] for the use of the spatial
Gillespie algorithm [97]), when density fluctuations are ne-
glected, the dynamics of the spatial RPS game on a domain
of unit size can be described by the following of partial dif-
ferential equations obtained by letting the lattice spacing 1/N
vanish in the continuum limit N →∞:
∂ta(r, t) = Dm∇2a(r, t) + qa(r, t)ρ∅ − pc(r, t)a(r, t)
∂tb(r, t) = Dm∇2b(r, t) + qb(r, t)ρ∅ − pa(r, t)b(r, t)
∂tc(r, t) = Dm∇2c(r, t) + qc(r, t)ρ∅ − pb(r, t)c(r, t),
(7)
FIG. 7: Emergence of target waves due to the application of a pe-
riodic current of all three strategies at the center of a square lattice.
The top row shows characteristic snapshots of the spatial grid over
time from left to right (note how the initial random state is gradually
transformed into a global target wave). The bottom row shows the
corresponding space-time plot, where the emergence of the cone in
the traveling front indicates the emergence of resonance between the
periodic current and the global oscillations. Colors red, blue, green
and gray denote rock (species A), paper (species B), scissor (species
C) and empty sites, respectively, like in Figs. 4 and 5. The system
size is N = 5122. For further details we refer to [139].
where r labels the two-dimensional position, while ρ∅ and
Dm denote the density of empty site and the diffusion co-
efficient (on a domain of unit size, Dm coincides with m),
respectively. This set of partial differential equations can be
solved numerically by standard finite difference methods, and
as illustrated in the bottom row of Fig. 5, the results are similar
to those obtained via Monte Carlo simulations.
By exploiting further the potential of prepared initial con-
ditions, it is also possible to observe multi-armed spirals, as
well as pairs of anti-spirals with a finite number of arms and
pairs [57]. We show examples of this fascinating pattern for-
mation in Fig. 6. An in-depth qualitative analysis reveals that
such multi-armed spirals and anti-spirals are more robust to
mobility that single-armed spirals, persisting not only at small
but also at intermediate mobility rates. In addition to prepared
initial conditions, periodic currents (or localized forcing) can
also be applied to evoke specific spatial patterns. If a peri-
odic current of all three strategies is applied at the center of
the lattice, target waves can be observed, as reported in [139].
Such phenomena emerge due to the interplay between local
and global system dynamics, in particular the intermittent syn-
chronization between the periodic current and the global os-
cillations of the density of the three competing strategies on
the spatial grid. In Fig. 7 we show how the global target wave
(top row from left to right) emerges due to the emergence of
resonance between the periodic current and the global oscilla-
tions (bottom row from left to right).
The impact of mobility can also be studied in off-lattice
simulations, where the radius of the interaction range cru-
cially affects coexistence. In particular, a transition from co-
existence to extinction is uncovered with a strikingly non-
8monotonous behavior in the coexistence probability [140].
Close to the minimal value of the coexistence probability and
under the influence of intermediate mobility, it is even possi-
ble to observe transitions between spiral and plane waves over
time, as depicted in Fig. 2 of [140]. In general, strong mo-
bility can either promote or impair coexistence depending on
the interaction range, although diversity is quite robust across
large regions of the parameter space [52]. Importantly, these
phenomena are absent in any lattice-based model, and it is
possible to explain them using partial differential equations
similar to Eq. (7). Off-lattice simulations of RPS and related
evolutionary games are still relatively unexplored. Partly this
is surely due to significantly higher computational resources
that are needed to simulate such systems in comparison to tra-
ditional spatial games, yet on the other hand, the efforts may
be well worth while as the off-lattice setup is closer to some
actual conditions than lattice-based simulations.
Another interesting phenomenon to consider that is directly
related to mobility is epidemic spreading. The effects of epi-
demic spreading on species coexistence in a spatial RPS game
have been studied in [51, 54, 141]. It has been shown that
in the absence of epidemic spreading, there exist extinction
basins that are spirally entangled for m > mc, while basins
of coexistence emerge for m < mc. Moreover, it has been
discovered that intra-species infection promotes coexistence,
while inter-species spreading fails to evoke the same effect
[51, 54, 141].
To close this subsection, we note that many more interesting
and counterintuitive phenomena are observable when more
than three strategies compete for space. In a four-strategy sys-
tem, for example, when a two-strategy neutral alliance may
emerge, the intensity of mobility is able to directly select the
winning solution of the subsystem [142]. More specifically,
if the mobility is small the RPS-type cyclic dynamics is dom-
inant, while if the mobility is large the two-strategy neutral
alliances take over. Further fascinating examples related to
cyclical interactions between more than three strategies are
reviewed in Section V.
C. Metapopulation and nonlinear mobility
In the previous section, as in the vast part of the litera-
ture, the two-dimensional RPS models were implemented on
square lattices whose nodes were either empty or occupied
by an A,B or C player, and the interactions described by
Eqs. (1),(3),(6) involved agents on neighboring sites. Inspired
by the experiments of [2, 16, 24], an alternative metapopula-
tion modeling approach allowing further analytical progress
has recently been put forward, see e.g. [91, 136, 143]. In
the metapopulation formulation, the lattice consists of an ar-
ray of L × L patches each of which comprises a well-mixed
(sub-)population of constant size N (playing the role of the
carrying capacity) that consists of A,B or C individuals and
empty spaces. The RPS game is then implemented accord-
ing to the general reactions Eqs. (1)-(4) between individuals
within the same patch (intra-patch reactions), while the spa-
tial degrees of freedom are granted by allowing the individ-
FIG. 8: Influence of nonlinear mobility on spiralling patterns in
the metapopulation RPS model defined by (1)-(4) and (8) with
(γd, γe) = (0.05, 0.05), (0.20, 0.05) from left to right respectively:
Typical snapshots in lattice simulations starting from ordered initial
conditions and with parameters L2 = 1282, N = 1024, p = q = 1,
z = 0.1 and µ = 10−6 ≪ µH = 0.042 (far below the Hopf bi-
furcation point). Left panel: Nonlinear mobility enhances the con-
vective instability and far field breakup of spiral waves. See [91] and
movies [145] for further details.
uals to move between neighboring patches. At this point, it
is interesting to divorce the pair-exchange (with rate γe) from
the hopping (with rate γd) process, according to the scheme
(X,Y = A,B,C)
XY
γe−→ Y X
X∅ γd−→ ∅X. (8)
As shown in [91, 144], this leads to nonlinear mobility when
γe 6= γd (see also [50, 109]). In biology, organisms are in
fact known not to simply move diffusively, but to sense and
respond to their environment. Here, Eq. (8) allows us to dis-
criminate between the movement in crowded regions, where
mobility is dominated by pair-exchange, and mobility in di-
luted regions where hopping can be more efficient.
The generic two-dimensional metapopulation model of
Eqs. (1)-(4), supplemented by Eq. (8), is ideally-suited to cap-
ture stochastic effects via size expansion in N [96] and, to
lowest order (where all fluctuations are neglected) and in the
continuum limit [144], yields the following partial differential
equations (PDEs)
∂ta = γd∇2a+ γnl[a∇2(b+ c)− (b+ c)∇2a]
+ a [qρ∅ + z(b− c)− pc] + µ(b + c− 2a)
∂tb = γd∇2b+ γnl[b∇2(a+ c)− (a+ c)∇2b]
+ b [qρ∅ + z(c− a)− pa] + µ(a+ c− 2b) (9)
∂tc = γd∇2c+ γnl[c∇2(a+ b)− (a+ b)∇2c]
+ c [qρ∅ + z(a− b)− pb] + µ(a+ b− 2c),
with γnl = γd − γe and the notation a ≡ a(r, t), b ≡ b(r, t)
and c ≡ c(r, t). We notice that nonlinear diffusive terms
of the form a∇2(b + c) − (b + c)∇2a arise when γnl 6= 0.
In [91, 137, 144], the solutions of Eq. (9) have been shown
shown to accurately match the stochastic simulations of the
metapopulation model performed using a spatial version of
the Gillespie algorithm [97]. It has been shown that the PDEs
9(9) accurately capture the properties of the lattice metapop-
ulation model as soon as the carrying capacity is N >∼ 64,
while their derivation assumes N ≫ 1 [91, 144]. Quite re-
markably, it turns out that certain outcomes of stochastic sim-
ulations with N = 2− 16 are qualitatively reproduced by the
solutions of Eqs. (9) [145].
In the next section we shall discuss how the PDEs (9) can be
used to derive a Complex Ginzburg-Landau equation (CGLE),
with an effective linear diffusive term, from which many of
the spatio-temporal properties of the spiraling patterns that we
have encountered can be predicted. Yet, some intriguing fea-
tures of the model triggered by nonlinear diffusion cannot be
captured by the CGLE. An interesting effect of nonlinear mo-
bility appears in the RPS model of Eqs. (1)-(4) at low muta-
tion rates when γd > γe: as illustrated in Fig. 8, in this case
the nonlinear mobility promotes the far field breakup of spiral
waves and enhances their convective instability [91, 144, 145].
D. Complex Ginzburg-Landau equation
The CGLE is a celebrated and well-studied nonlinear equa-
tion commonly used in the physics community to describe a
variety of phenomena spanning from superconductivity, su-
perfluidity, liquid crystals to field theory [146]. After the in-
troduction of a phenomenological time-dependent Ginzburg-
Landau theory for superconductors [147], the CGLE was de-
rived in the context of fluid dynamics [148, 149] and is known
for its ability to predict the emergence of complex coherent
structures, such as spiral waves in two-spatial dimensions,
as well as chaotic behavior. Its fascinating properties have
received considerable interest and are the subject of numer-
ous reviews, see e.g. [146, 150]. It has recently been real-
ized that many of the spatio-temporal properties of the two-
dimensional RPS models can be understood by means of a
suitable mapping onto a CGLE [3, 45, 133].
The first attempts to use the CGLE in the context of spatial
RPS games have been carried out in [3, 45, 133] for the model
with dominance-removal reactions (1), while z = µ = 0,
and pair exchange in Eq. (6). At mean field level, this model
is characterized by an unstable coexistence fixed point s∗ with
one stable eigenvector, and the dynamics quickly approaches a
manifold tangent to the plane normal to the stable eigenvector
of s∗. In [3, 45, 133] that manifold was computed to quadratic
order around s∗. On such manifold, the dynamics becomes
two-dimensional and the mean field flows approach the ab-
sorbing boundaries of the phase portrait where they linger and
form a heteroclinic cycle [87, 93]. Exploiting a suitable non-
linear (“near-identity”) transformation, effectively mapping
(a, b, c)−s∗ onto the new variables z = (z1, z2) and by retain-
ing terms up to cubic order in z, the rate equations (5) was then
recast in the normal form of a Hopf bifurcation. As explained
in [28, 133], where details of the derivation can be found,
space and movement were finally reinstated by adding a lin-
ear diffusive term to rate equations in the z variables yielding
a CGLE. It has to be noted that such an approach relies on
three uncontrolled approximations:
(i) It consists of approximating heteroclinic cycles by stable
limit cycles resulting from a fictitious Hopf bifurcation.
(ii) While the new variables z1 and z2 are assumed to be small
quantities, and therefore the mapping is expected to be suit-
able near s∗, its use is not restricted to the vicinity of s∗.
(iii) Even though mobility is mediated by pair exchange in
Eq. (6), which results in linear diffusion in the PDEs (7), the
nonlinear mapping (a, b, c)− s∗ → z generates nonlinear dif-
fusive terms that are ignored by the CGLE.
Notwithstanding, this approach has been able to explain
many qualitative features of the above model and, upon ad-
justing one fitting parameter, even obtain approximations for
the wavelength of spiraling patterns and the velocity of the
propagating fronts [3, 45, 133]. This treatment was then
extended to the case of dominance-removal and dominance-
replacement cyclic competitions with linear mobility and no
mutations (p, z, γ > 0, µ = 0) [46, 143]. Recently, a
class of RPS-like models with more than three species (with
dominance-removal and hopping but no mutations) has also
been considered by generalizing this approach [151].
Recently, an alternative analytical treatment has been de-
vised to derive perturbatively the CGLE associated with the
generic class of RPS models defined by the reactions Eqs. (1)-
(4), and with mobility mediated by pair-exchange and hop-
ping in Eq. (8) [91, 144]. This alternative derivation has
been carried out within the metapopulation formulation out-
lined in Sec. III C. The key observation is that the mean field
dynamics of the model defined by Eqs. (1)-(4) is character-
ized by a Hopf bifurcation at µ = µH (see Sec. II) and by
stable limit cycles when µ < µH . A multiscale expansion
around the Hopf bifurcation is appropriate to derive a CGLE
that aptly describes the fascinating oscillatory patterns aris-
ing on two-dimensional lattices when µ < µH . As explained
in [91, 137], a space and time perturbation expansion in the
parameter ǫ ∝ √µH − µ is performed by introducing the
“slow variables” (T,R) = (ǫ2t, ǫr) and by expanding the
densities in powers of ǫ, see e.g. [152]. Hence, after a suit-
able linear transformation (a, b, c)− (a∗, b∗, c∗)→ (u, v, w),
where w decouples from u and v (to linear order), one writes
u(r, t) =
∑3
n=1 ǫ
nU (n)(t, T,R), v =
∑3
n=1 ǫ
nV (n) and
w =
∑3
n=1 ǫ
nW (n), where the functions U (n), V (n),W (n)
are of order O(1). Substituting these expressions into Eq. (9)
with U (1) + iV (1) = A(T,R)eiωHt, where A is a (complex)
modulated amplitude, the CGLE is thus derived by imposing
the removal of the secular term arising at order O(ǫ3), which
yields [91, 137, 144]
∂TA = δ∆RA+A− (1 + ic)|A|2A, (10)
where δ = 3qγe+pγd3q+p , ∆R = ∂
2
r1
+ ∂2r2 and, after rescalingA
by a constant [137],
c =
12z(6q− p)(p+ q) + p2(24q − p)
3
√
3p(6q + p)(p+ 2z)
. (11)
It is worth stressing that the CGLE (10) is a controlled approx-
imation of the PDEs (9) around the Hopf bifurcation point,
and it is noteworthy that it involves a linear (real) effective
diffusion coefficient. The CGLE (10) permits an accurate
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FIG. 9: Upper: Typical snapshots of the phases AI, EI, BS, SA
(from left to right) obtained from lattice simulations with parame-
ters q = γe = γd = 1, µ = 0.02, L = 128, N = 64 and, from left
to right, z = (1.8, 1.2, 0.6, 0). Lower: Phase diagram of the two-
dimensional RPS system (1)-(4) around the Hopf bifurcation point
with contours of c = (cAI, cEI, cBS) in the p− z plane, see text. We
distinguish four phases: spiral waves are unstable in AI, EI and SA
phases, while they are stable in BS phase. The boundaries between
the phases have been obtained using (11). See [91] for full details.
characterization of the spatio-temporal patterns in the vicin-
ity of the Hopf Bifurcation point. For simplicity, we here re-
strict σ and ζ into [0,3]. Using the well-known phase dia-
gram of the two-dimensional CGLE [146, 153], one thus dis-
tinguishes four phases separated by the three critical values
(cAI, cEI, cBS) ≈ (1.75, 1.25, 0.845), as illustrated in Fig. 9
(upper panel): the absolute instability (AI) phase in which no
stable spiral waves cannot be sustained (when c > cAI), the
Eckhaus instability (EI) phase in which spiral waves are con-
vectively unstable, with spirals’ arms that far from the cores
first distort and then break up (when cEI < c < cAI), the
bound state (BS) phase characterized by stable spiral waves
with well defined wavelength and frequency (when cBS < c <
cEI), and a phase in which spiral waves annihilate when they
collide (SA phase, when 0 < c < cBS).
The properties of the CGLE (10) have also be exploited
to gain insight into the properties of the spatio-temporal pat-
terns arising away from the Hopf Bifurcation, where the SA
phase appears to be generally replaced by an extended BS
phase [137, 144, 145]. Yet, it has also been found that when
p ≫ z an Eckhaus-like far-field break-up of the spiral waves
occurs away from the Hopf bifurcation, very much like in
Fig. 4 (bottom), see Ref. [144].
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FIG. 10: Phase diagram of an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game
with the “tit-for-tat” (T ) strategy, as obtained on a random regu-
lar graph. In addition to the pure defection (D) phase, the sta-
tionary two-strategy C +D phase, and the stationary three-strategy
C+D+T phase, there also exists a parameter region where all three
competing strategies coexist in an oscillatory phase (O). The sponta-
neous emergence of cyclic dominance therefore sustain cooperation
(C) even at prohibitively high temptations to defect. For further de-
tails we refer to [170].
IV. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH SPONTANEOUSLY
EMERGING CYCLIC DOMINANCE
Cyclic dominance occurs not only in RPS and related evo-
lutionary games where the closed loop of dominance is ex-
plicitly imposed on the competing strategies through the di-
rections of invasions between them (see Fig. 1). Quite remark-
ably, cyclical interactions may occur spontaneously in any
evolutionary game where the competing strategies are three or
more, and it is also possible to observe them in two-strategy
games if certain player-specific properties are time-dependent
[78]. Well-known examples include the classic public goods
game [31], where in addition to cooperators and defectors the
third competing strategy is volunteering [68, 69, 154–157],
rewarding [75, 76, 158–160], or punishing [70, 71, 161–164].
Further examples include the ultimatum game with discrete
strategies [165], the public goods game with pool punishment
[73, 166–168], as well as the public goods game with corre-
lated positive (reward) and negative (punishment) reciprocity
[169].
As in the original RPS game, in these evolutionary games
too the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance promotes
the coexistence of competing strategies, and through that it
stabilizes solutions that would otherwise be unstable. As such,
the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is one of the
main driving forces behind complex pattern formation, which
in turn is responsible for the many differences between evolu-
tionary outcomes reported in well-mixed and structured pop-
ulations. Examples include the stabilization of reward [75]
and punishment [70] in structured populations, the evolution
of empathy and fairness in human bargaining [165], as well as
an oscillatory coexistence of defection and cooperation with
the “tit-for-tat” (T ) strategy [170–172]. The latter example is
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particularly instructive, as there is a transition from a three-
strategy stationary state to a three-strategy oscillatory state
that occurs in dependence on the cost of the “tit-for-tat” strat-
egy. This phase transition is possible only in a structured pop-
ulation, and only because there is a spontaneous emergence
of cyclic dominance between the three competing strategies.
The complete phase diagram is shown in Fig. 10, where the
dotted blue line delineates to two three-strategy phases. It is
worth emphasizing that an oscillatory state emerges not be-
cause of a time-varying interaction network (the importance
of which we have emphasized in Subsection III A in the realm
of the RPS game), but solely due to the relations between the
competing strategies as defined via the payoff matrix.
Another example that merits attention is the stabilization of
punishment in the realm of the public goods game. In gen-
eral, punishers bear an additional cost if they wish to sanction
defectors, and thus face evolutionary pressure not only from
defectors, but also from pure cooperators, which effectively
become second-order free-riders [173–175]. Accordingly, in
well-mixed populations punishment is evolutionary unstable
in the absence of additional mechanisms or further strategic
complexity. In structured populations, however, punishment
alone introduces cyclic dominance such that punishing coop-
erators are able to invade defectors, defectors are able to in-
vade pure cooperators, and pure cooperators are able to invade
punishers [70]. Even more complex evolutionary outcomes
are possible in case of pool punishment [73], where one “strat-
egy” in the closed loop of dominance can be an alliance of two
strategies (for further details we refer to Subsection IV C).
Interestingly, the introduction of self-organized punishment,
when the fine increases proportional with the activity of defec-
tors, prevents the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance
and results in a more effective way of punishment [176]. In the
latter case, however, the stability of punishers is not directly
challenged by pure cooperators (second-order free-riders), as
the punishing activity (and the additional cost of sanctioning)
seizes in the absence of defectors.
A. Time-dependent learning
As we have noted above, cyclical interactions may occur
spontaneously not only if the competing strategies are three or
more, but also in two-strategy games if certain player-specific
properties are time-dependent. One such example concerns
time-dependent strategy learning ability of players in the spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma game [78]. In a preceding work [177],
it has been shown that a limited teaching activity of players
after a successful strategy pass modifies the propagation of
strategies in a biased way and can promote the evolution of
cooperation in social dilemmas. A significantly different ef-
fect, however, can be observed if the learning ability of play-
ers is time-dependent [78]. A temporarily impaired learning
activity generates cyclic dominance between defectors and co-
operators, which helps to maintain the diversity of strategies
via propagating waves, as illustrated in Fig. 11. Consequently,
cooperators can coexist with defectors even at extremely ad-
verse conditions. This result is particularly inspiring because
a b c
FIG. 11: Spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance due to the
introduction of time-dependent learning ability of players in the spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma game. Cooperators (blue) and defectors (red)
become entailed in a close loop of dominance, which is mediated
by the time-varying learning ability. Pale (dark) shades of blue and
red encode low (high) learning ability of cooperators and defectors,
respectively. Traveling waves emerge from an initial cluster of coop-
erators located in the center of the square lattice (not shown). From
there on, the waves spread across the whole population [from panel
(a) towards (c)], thus allowing the survival of cooperators even at
very high temptations to defect. For further details we refer to [78].
it indicates the possibility of a time-dependent player-specific
property to effective replace a third strategy in a closed loop
of dominance. Hence, cyclic dominance can emerge between
two competing strategies only. Other works on dynamical
learning in games with cyclic interactions, where agents sam-
ple a finite number of moves of their opponents between each
update, have shown how demographic fluctuations can lead to
noise-sustained cyclic orbits [178, 179].
B. Voluntary participation
Evolutionary games with voluntary participation where
among the first to record the spontaneous emergence of cyclic
dominance outside the realm of the traditional RPS formal-
ism. In particular, the coexistence of cooperators and defec-
tors due to the presence of volunteers (or loners) was initially
reported in well-mixed populations [68, 69], where the cyclic
invasions among the three competing strategies resulted in an
oscillatory state. Inspired by Alice’s Adventures in Wonder-
land, where the Red Queen found that it takes a lot of running
to stand still, the emergence of oscillations that were needed
to sustain cooperation was dubbed accordingly as the “Red
Queen” effect. Notably, the terms has been proposed in the
early 70’s [103] as an evolutionary hypothesis based on which
organisms must constantly adapt and evolve, not merely to
gain a reproductive advantage, but also simply to survive.
Today, volunteering is known as a viable mechanisms to
avert the tragedy of the commons [180] within the realm of
the public goods game. Hauert et al. [68] studied this phe-
nomenon by assuming that individuals have three available
strategies, namely unconditional cooperation, defection and
volunteering, which resulted in a RPS-like evolutionary dy-
namics. In particular, if there are nc cooperators,nd defectors,
and nl loners in the group, then actually only k = nc+nd in-
dividuals are involved in the public goods game. Defectors
thus get the payoff rnc/k, where r > 1 is the multiplication
factor that takes into account the synergetic effects of a group
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effort, while cooperators gain (rnc/k)− 1 (here−1 is due to
their contribution to the common pool, which defectors with-
hold). At the same time, loners who do not participate in the
game, get a fixed small payoff σ, such that 0 < σ < r − 1.
Based on numerical simulations and the analysis of the repli-
cator equation, it quickly follows that frequencies of all three
strategies exhibit oscillations over time if r > 2. These the-
oretical results have been confirmed by human experiments
performed by Semmann et al. [69], which revealed that volun-
teering reduces the size of groups engaged in the public goods
game, and that cooperation is indeed promoted through time-
dependent oscillations. The rationale is that defectors outper-
form cooperators in a large predominantly cooperative group,
yet as soon as defectors become the predominant force, it pays
more to be a loner. But as loners grow in numbers and the ac-
tual size of the group participating in the game decreases, co-
operation again becomes viable, and so the loop of dominance
closes.
Motivated by the pioneering human experiments [69], a
new experiment has been designed and conducted with a to-
tal of 90 undergraduate students from Wenzhou University,
who participated in repeated public goods games with volun-
teering in groups of five. The principal goal was to measure
the average frequencies of strategies over time. The payoffs
were the same as described in the preceding paragraph, thus
designating σ and the multiplication factor r as the two main
parameters. The results are summarized in Fig. 12, which
confirm that all three strategies coexist within a wide range
of parameter values. However, the time-averaged frequencies
depend on the actual values of σ and r. As shown in both
panels of Fig. 12, defectors are most common for σ = 0.5 and
r = 3.0, which reverses in favor of loners for σ = 1.5 and
r = 3.0, thus experimentally confirming the expected pro-
motion of loners as σ increases. The dominance of loners is
even more remarkable for σ = 2.5 and r = 3.0, but shifts
towards cooperators for σ = 2.5 and r = 6.0, as shown in
Fig. 12(b). This in turn confirms the evolutionary advantage
of cooperators that is warranted by higher multiplication fac-
tors. Interestingly, the outcome of these experiments indicate
that the coexistence of the three strategies is more widespread
than predicted by theory. For example, all three strategies co-
exist even for σ > r − 1 [see σ = 2.5 and r = 3.0 case in
Fig. 12(b)], which may be attributed to the bounded rational-
ity and emotions of participants that are not accounted for in
simulations.
Aside from the theoretical explorations of the public goods
game with volunteering in well-mixed populations and the
above-described human experiments, the public goods game
with volunteering in structured populations received its fare
share of attention as well. In the light of the reviewed results
on the spatial RPS game, it is perhaps little surprising that
structured populations also maintain the survival of all three
competing strategies, but they do so not through the emer-
gence of oscillations, but rather through time-wise constant
fractions of cooperators, defectors and loners [154]. However,
the topology of the interaction network can play a key role,
much the same as by the RPS game [118, 121]. Specifically,
if the interaction network has sufficiently strongly pronounced
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FIG. 12: Widespread coexistence of cooperators, loners and de-
fectors in an experimental public goods game with volunteering.
Columns displays the time-averaged frequencies that were chosen by
the 90 participants of this human experiment, depending on the pay-
off of loners σ and the multiplication factor r. (a) The multiplication
factor r = 3.0 was set fixed, while two different values of σ were
considered (see figure legend). (b) The payoff of loners σ = 2.5
was set fixed, while two different values of r were considered (see
figure legend). Importantly, the coexistence of all three strategies is
significantly more widespread than predicted by theory, which may
be attributed to the bounded rationality and emotions that are not ac-
counted for in simulations. The whiskers in both panels show the
standard error of the displayed time-averaged frequencies (rates).
small-world properties (there exists a threshold in the fraction
of shortcut links that must be exceeded), then the stationary
three-strategy phase gives way to an oscillatory three-strategy
phase [155, 181]. Further strengthening the analogies between
the RPS game and the public goods game with volunteering,
we note that oscillations in the latter can also be evoked not
only through changes in the topology of the interaction net-
work, but also through changes in the payoffs, as illustrated in
Fig. 1 of [181].
Interestingly, the so-called joker strategy, introduced by
Arenas et al. [182], is conceptually different from the loner
strategy, but has a similar impact on the evolution of cooper-
ation in social dilemmas. In particular, in finite well-mixed
populations oscillations emerge spontaneously, and this irre-
spective of the system size and the type of strategy updating
[79, 182], thus adding yet further support to the relevance of
cyclic dominance in evolutionary games.
C. When three competing strategies are more than three
If the competing strategies in an evolutionary game are
more than two (with some exceptions, as described in Subsec-
tion IV A), this opens up the possibility for the spontaneous
emergence of cyclic dominance with much the same prop-
erties that characterize the classical RPS game. Sometimes,
however, three competing strategies are more than three, be-
cause some subsystem solutions, typically composed of a sub-
set of the three original strategies, manifest as an additional
“strategy”. The fourth “strategy” is not exactly equivalent to
the original three strategies because it only emerges during the
evolutionary process, yet its involvement in the closed loop of
dominance is just as important. These rather exotic solutions,
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FIG. 13: In structured populations three competing strategies can in
fact be more than three. The spontaneous emergence of cyclic domi-
nance can be driven by pure strategies, as well as by stable alliances
of a subset of pure strategies, which in the closed loop of dominance
act just the same. Left panel: Cyclic dominance between coopera-
tors (blue), defectors (red), and a stable alliance between defectors
and pool punishers (red and green). Here defectors beat coopera-
tors, who beat the alliance of defectors and pool punishers, who in
turn beat pure defectors [73]. Note that one “strategy” in the closed
loop of dominance is thus an alliance of two strategies. Right panel:
Cyclic dominance in the spatial ultimatum game with discrete strate-
gies [165]. Two emphatic strategies, E1 (light blue) and E2 (navy
blue), compete with a strategy A (red) that is characterized by a par-
ticular (p, q) pair. Here E1 beats the stable alliance of E2 + A, who
in turn beats E2, who in turn beats E1,thus closing the loop of dom-
inance. As in the spatial public goods game with pool punishment,
here to one “strategy” in the loop is an alliance of two strategies.
which can be observed only in structured populations, have
recently been reported in the spatial public goods game with
pool punishment [73], and in the spatial ultimatum game with
discrete strategies [165].
In the spatial public goods game with pool punishment, we
initially have three competing strategies, which are cooper-
ators (C), defectors (D), and pool punishers (P ). Quite re-
markably, at certain parameter values (see [73] for details),
defectors and pool punishers form a stable alliance, which
effectively manifests as a strategy, and this strategy forms
a closed loop of dominance with cooperators and defectors.
Cyclic dominance ensues, where in addition to the two pure
strategies C and D, the D+P alliance is the third competing
strategy. As a consequence, the characteristic spatial patterns
feature propagating fronts made up of all the mentioned com-
petitors, as illustrated in the left panel of Fig. 13.
The peculiarity of the above-described solution indicates
that it may not be satisfactory to describe the actual state of
a three-strategy system by a single “point” in a ternary phase
diagram. Namely, just the fractions of the competing strate-
gies do not necessarily determine the actual state of the system
in an unambiguous way, and this is because spatiality offers an
additional degree of freedom in comparison to solutions that
can be observed in well-mixed populations. As described in
[73], this new degree of freedom may give rise to an addi-
tional “strategy” that is as such not present at the start of the
evolutionary process.
Importantly, although such evolutionary solutions may at
first glance appear as special and perhaps even limited out-
comes of a particular evolutionary game, we emphasize that
they may in fact be common place. To corroborate this, we
review a completely different evolutionary game, namely the
spatial ultimatum game with discrete strategies [165]. Unlike
in the public goods game, in the ultimatum game the focus is
not on the aversion of the tragedy of the commons, but rather
on the evolution of empathy and fairness [183]. While discrete
strategies still cover the whole (p, q) proposal-acceptance pa-
rameter plane, the discreetness takes into consideration the
fact that in reality these levels are coarse-grained rather than
continuous. Thus, instead of the infinite number of continuous
strategies, we have N discrete strategies Ei, defined accord-
ing to their (p, q) interval (see [165] for details). If p = q, we
have N different classes of empathetic players who can com-
pete with an additional strategy A that is characterized by an
arbitrary (p, q) pair. Most crucially, the finite number of com-
peting strategies enables pattern formation, and as illustrated
in the right panel of Fig. 13, cyclic dominance may emerge
spontaneously where a member in the closed loop of domi-
nance can be an alliance of two strategies. This example, in
addition to the previously described one concerning the spatial
public goods game with pool punishment [73], thus corrobo-
rates the fact that in structured populations three competing
strategies can in fact be more than three.
V. CYCLIC DOMINANCE BETWEEN MORE THAN
THREE STRATEGIES
Extensions of the classical RPS game to more than three
competing strategies are straightforward (see Fig. 1), and in
addition to their obvious appeal from the theoretical point of
view [81, 94, 123, 151, 184], such games also find actual
applicability in describing competition in microbial popula-
tions [82] and larger ecological food webs and communities
[22, 23, 185–188]. Based on the review of results concerning
the RPS and related three-strategy evolutionary games with
cyclic dominance, it is little surprising that the complexity
of spatial patterns, and indeed the complexity of evolution-
ary solutions in general, increases drastically as we increase
the number of strategies that form a closed loop of dominance.
The spontaneous emergence of defensive alliances and numer-
ous stable spatial distributions that are separated by first and
second-order phase transitions are just some of the phenom-
ena that one is likely to observe.
The reason behind the mushrooming number of stable so-
lutions with the rising number of competing strategies lies in
the fact that the solutions of subsystems, where some strate-
gies are missing, can also be solutions of the whole system.
The final stationary state can thus be determined not only by
the competition of individual strategies, but also by the com-
petition of subsystem solutions (defensive alliances) that are
characterized by their own composition and spatiotemporal
distribution of strategies (we have already reviewed two such
examples in Fig. 13). Consequently, the general understand-
ing of evolutionary games with many competing strategies re-
quires the systematic analysis and comparison of all possible
subsystem solutions, i.e., solutions, that are formed by just a
subset of all available strategies.
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FIG. 14: Globally synchronized oscillations in a four-strategy cyclic
dominance game [123]. Depicted are simplex representations of the
time evolution of the four densities for three different combinations
of the fraction of long-range links Q and the heterogeneity of the
food web χ (see legend). Starting from the initially random ho-
mogenous state (black dot), the system evolves (left) towards finite
size, stochastic fluctuations around the asymptotically stable fixed
point (the amplitude of these fluctuations decreases with increasing
system size [189]), (middle) towards global oscillations, where the
asymptotic state is a limit cycle whose perimeter may be used as an
order parameter for the transition, or (right) towards global oscilla-
tions, where the orbit approaches the heteroclinic one and the aver-
age perimeter is close to the maximum value. We refer to [123] for
further details.
The simplest generalization of the RPS game is towards a
four-strategy cyclic dominance game [47, 190–192]. As re-
ported in [47], the formation of spiral patterns takes place only
without a conservation law for the total density, and like in the
three-strategy case, strong mobility can destroy species coex-
istence. Cyclic dominance among four strategies also gives
rise to so-called “neutral” strategies, who do not invade each
other — an option that is not available among three competing
strategies. In the absence of mixing, neutral strategies can eas-
ily result in population-wide frozen states, where only those
strategies are present who do not invade each other. More pre-
cisely, the coexistence of all four strategies is limited only to
a rather narrow range of invasion rates, whereas otherwise the
system evolves into a frozen state where only neutral strate-
gies are present [66]. This observation further supports the
fact that the topology of the food web alone cannot unambigu-
ously determine the evolutionary outcome of cyclical interac-
tions. In addition, the invasion rates and the interaction range
are likewise crucial parameters that determine the transitions
from coexistence to uniformity among cyclically competing
strategies [188, 189, 193].
Globally synchronized oscillations in a four-strategy cyclic
dominance game are also possible, as reported in [123] and
presented in Fig. 14. In fact, Rulquin and Arenzon [123]
have shown that such coexistence phases require less long-
range interactions than three-strategy phases, although intu-
itively one would expect the opposite. Since the emergence of
long distance, global synchronization states is thus possible
even when the food web has multiple subloops and several
possible local cycles, this leads to the conjecture that global
oscillations might be a general characteristic, even for large,
realistic food webs.
In addition to the coexistence of all competing strategies,
the emergence of “frozen” states, and global oscillations men-
tioned above, curvature driven domain growth is also pos-
sible when the evolutionary dynamics is governed by inter-
actions of equal strength among more than three strategies
[56, 59, 60]. In this case, the time dependence of the areas
of different domains, which can be quantified effectively by
means of the length of domain walls, conforms to the well-
known algebraic law of the domain growth process [194].
A. Alliances
The subject that deserves particular attention within the
realm of cyclic dominance between more than three strategies
is the formation of alliances. As described in the introduc-
tory paragraphs of this section, alliances play a key role in the
fascinating complexity and multitude of solutions that grace
such systems, particularly through the formation of subsys-
tems solutions that together with the pure strategies form the
complete solutions of the whole system.
Alliances can emerge in strikingly different ways, although
the most common one is the formation of so-called defen-
sive alliances. For example, in a four-strategy predator-prey
system, two neutral strategies can defend each other from the
two external invaders [195], hence the name a “defensive al-
liance”. The protective role of an alliance can also be observed
when three cyclically dominating strategies are present. In
this case, they can protect each other from an external invader
by invading the predator of their prey [184]. We also empha-
size that cyclically dominant strategies may not necessarily
form defensive alliances, even if the governing food web is
complex and large. For example, in Fig. 1(d) the strategies
RS +KS + SS form a subsystem solution, but this is not an
alliance as it is vulnerable against the invasion of an external
strategy. On the other hand, the strategies RS + KR + SK
form an actual alliance, and a membership in the latter can
effectively protect all three strategies within the loop from an
external invasion.
Moreover, if the number of competing strategies is high
enough, it is also possible to observe the competition between
the different alliances [81]. Alliance-specific invasion rates,
however, can break the symmetry of the food web, and sub-
sequently only a single alliance survives [196]. The com-
plexity of a six-species predator-prey food web with alliance-
specific invasions rates also enables noise-guided evolution
within cyclical interactions [67], which is deeply rooted in
short-range spatial correlations and is conceptually related to
the coherence resonance phenomenon in dynamical systems
via the mechanism of threshold duality [197–200].
When it comes to the study of alliances within games of
cyclic dominance, the general question to answer is which
strategies are capable to form alliances? As we have reviewed
above, two strategies are sufficient to form an alliance, but of
course three or even more strategies could also form one. The
phase diagram presented in Fig. 15 demonstrates that in fact
all the mentioned alliances can be present in the stable solu-
tion of the system, depending also on the parameter values
that determine invasion and mixing in the studied six-species
predator-prey system [201]. The key property that determines
wether an alliance is viable or not is its ability to invade other
alliances or resist such an invasion itself. Like by the competi-
tion among pure strategies, here too the appropriate approach
is to measure directly the velocity of invasion between com-
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FIG. 15: Who can form an alliance? The displayed phase diagram
of stable solutions in dependence on the invasion rate (α) and the
strength of mixing (X) in a six-species predator-prey system reveals
that in fact all possible alliances between two or more competing
strategies can be viable at specific parameter regions [201]. In the
upper left corner, the three-strategy cyclic alliance 0 + 2 + 4 or the
three-strategy cyclic alliance 1 + 3 + 5 will dominate the system. In
the parameter region marked by TC(D), on the other hand, three al-
liances, each consisting of two-neutral strategies, play the RPS game
at a higher level, i.e., at the level of competing alliances (rather than
pure strategies). Within the shadowed parameter region all the men-
tioned alliances coexist.
peting domains that contain specific subsystem solutions [63].
The use of special initial conditions, like the one illustrated in
Fig. 16 (remnants of the straight vertical interface that sep-
arated two three-strategy cyclic alliances can still be clearly
inferred), is thereby very useful and recommended. Unlike
by pure strategies, however, here we first need to partition the
population and wait for the appropriate subsystem solutions
to emerge before removing the barriers along the interfaces.
Importantly, the formation of alliances is not always the
consequence of specific relations within the governing food
web. Alliances may also emerge spontaneously during the
evolutionary process, for example due to payoff relations be-
tween the competing strategies that are due to multi-point
(group) interactions. The phenomenon was observed in the
spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators
and defectors both pool (O) and peer (E) punishers competed
for space [202]. Figure 16 illustrates an example of the spon-
taneous emergence of two three-strategy cyclic alliances. No-
tably, either the D + C + O or the E + O +D alliance can
be stable solutions of the whole system at specific values of
the punishment cost and fine. But if they meet, as displayed
in Fig. 16, the E+O+D alliance will invade the D+C+O
alliance. Remarkably, the invasion process between the two
alliances is effectively the same as it would be between two
pure strategies.
As by the competition among pure strategies [3], by the
competition of alliances too the role of mobility (or diffusion)
is likewise important. Within the framework of a nine-species
predator-prey model [184], it has been shown that below a
critical mobility rate, the system exhibits expanding domains
FIG. 16: Alliances may also form spontaneously, without support
from specific relations within the governing food web. This is par-
ticularly common in games that are played in groups [31], where
the payoffs stemming from the multi-point interactions may give rise
to relations between the competing strategies that make the forma-
tion of an alliance evolutionary most advantageous. One particular
such example concerns the spatial public goods game with pool (O)
(light green) and peer (E) (dark green) punishment, where the three-
strategy cyclic alliance D + C + O and the three-strategy cyclic
alliance E+O+D emerge spontaneously. Subsequently, these two
alliances compete for space effectively as “strategies”, thereby giv-
ing rise to complex yet beautiful spatial patterns. Cooperators are
blue while defectors are denoted red.
of three different defensive alliances, each consisting of three
cyclically dominant species. Due to the neutral relationship
between these three defensive alliances, a voter-model type
coarsening starts [203], and after a sufficiently long time only
one alliance survives if the system has finite size. Above the
critical mobility rate, however, the three defensive alliances
can all coexist [44]. In a way, the effect of high mobility is
thus the opposite to the one observed in the RPS game. There
high mobility rates jeopardize diversity and lead to the sur-
vival of a single strategy [3], while the coexistence of defen-
sive alliances may receive unexpected support. Further related
to the impact of mobility on the survival of alliances, a recent
study has demonstrated that mobility-dependent selection can
prefer either a three-strategy cyclic alliance or a neutral pair
of two-strategy alliances within a four-strategy system [142].
At this point, we again emphasize that it is not enough to
simply separate random mixtures of selected strategies that
are involved in particular alliances and monitor the evolution.
Before the barriers along the interfaces are removed, a suf-
ficiently long relaxation time has to be taken into account,
which allows the actual subsystem solutions (rather than just
the random mixtures of the involved strategies) to emerge.
Only then will the actual competition between the alliances
unfold and give correct insights into the power relations be-
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tween them. In the absence of such a procedure, it may easily
happen that one of the considered subsystem solution cannot
evolve fast enough, for example due to requiring a longer re-
laxation time than another subsystem solution, and thus it be-
comes impossible to properly compare their viability. A spe-
cific example to that effect concerns a five-strategy predator-
prey system [63, 204], where if the mobility is strong enough
the dominance between the competing alliances can vanish si-
multaneously. This phenomenon is then also accompanied by
a divergence in the density fluctuations of individual strate-
gies. In the absence of mobility, however, the dominance be-
tween the alliances does not vanish simultaneously, and only a
sharp peak in the density fluctuations can be observed instead
of the power-law divergence. The phenomena observed in the
realm of this five-strategy predator-prey system in fact outline
a more general type of behavior, namely the mobility-induced
reversal of the direction of invasion between the competing
alliances, thus highlighting yet again that the topology of the
food web does not always (in fact it does so only rarely) deter-
mine the final evolutionary outcome in structured populations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
As we hope this review clearly shows, cyclical interactions
are a fascinating subject which has the power to captivate with
the complexity and beauty of the governing evolutionary dy-
namics, and which in addition to this has many real-life appli-
cations that we have only begun to fully appreciate. We have
reviewed main results in well-mixed populations with the fo-
cus on oscillatory dynamics and the extinction to absorbing
states due to finite system size. We have also reviewed re-
sults on the classical RPS game in structured populations. We
have first focused on the important role of the topology of
the interaction networks, which may induce oscillatory states,
although the latter can be evoked by changes in the game
parametrization too. We have also focused extensively on mo-
bility, which has many practical implications as in real life
prey and predators are frequently on the move in order to max-
imize their chances of survival. We have emphasized that mo-
bility can either promote or jeopardize biodiversity, and it may
give rise to fascinatingly rich pattern formation, including spi-
ral and target waves, multi-armed spirals with two, three and
four arms, as well as anti-spirals. Mobility can also affect the
basins of coexistence and extinction through intra-species and
inter-species epidemic spreading. An alternative metapopula-
tion modeling approach is also reviewed, where the distinction
of pair-exchange and hopping processes allows us to discrim-
inate movement in crowded and in diluted regions. The re-
sulting nonlinear mobility promotes the far field breakup of
spiral waves and enhances their convective instability. Within
this metapopulation formulation, we have also derived pertur-
batively the complex Ginzburg-Landau equation.
In addition to the review of the well-mixed and spatial rock-
paper-scissors game, we have also given special attention to
evolutionary games where cyclic dominance emerges sponta-
neously, for example between only two competing strategies
through time-dependent learning, among three strategies in
public goods game with volunteering, punishment or reward,
as well as by means of the introduction of the joker strategy.
We have reviewed how alliances may effectively act as strate-
gies and close the loop of dominance in three-strategy evo-
lutionary games, including the public goods game with pool
punishment and the ultimatum game with discrete strategies.
From there onwards, we have surveyed cyclic dominance
when the competing strategies are more than three, where
we have emphasized the possibility of competition between
alliances. We have highlighted the importance of the cor-
rect preparation of special initial conditions that allow proper
monitoring of the invasion relations between the alliances, and
we have given prominent exposure to the fact that alliances
may also form spontaneously, without support from specific
relations within the governing food web.
There are still unexplored problems related to cyclic dom-
inance in evolutionary games that merit further attention.
While physics-inspired studies account for the majority of re-
cent theoretical advances on this topic, there also exist much
experimental and theoretical work that was outside the scope
of this review. Competitive intransitivity and the coexis-
tence of species in intransitive networks [205, 206], as well
as community-scale biodiversity in ecological systems with a
large number of species [207] and the governing large com-
petitive networks [185–187], are just some of the topics that
we did not cover in detail. While we have mentioned sev-
eral experiments and empirical data that corroborate the im-
portance of cyclical interaction in the Introduction, covering
this in detail could easily amount to an independent review. In
addition to the often-cited examples mentioned in the Intro-
duction, most recent experimental research suggests that we
may have only just begun to scratch the surface of the actual
importance of cyclic dominance in nature [83, 84]. It would be
desirable for the fundamental theoretical advances to become
more in sync with the experiments by means of more dedi-
cated and precise mathematical modeling. It is worth noting
that cyclic dominance could be crucial not just to understand
biodiversity, but also social diversity [208–210].
In terms of future fundamental research, we would like to
point towards the basically unexplored subject of cyclic domi-
nance in group interactions. In social dilemmas, the transition
from pairwise to group interactions [211, 212] brings with it
many qualitative changes in the evolutionary dynamics (see
[31] for a review), and the reasonable expectation is that the
same would hold true in games of cyclic dominance too. We
have recently considered the impact of different interaction
ranges in the spatial RPS game, and found that the transition
from pairwise to group interactions can decelerate and even
revert the direction of the invasion between the competing
strategies [193]. These results thus indicate that, in addition
to the invasion rates and other properties of cyclic dominance
games already reviewed here, the interaction range is at least
as important for the maintenance of biodiversity among cycli-
cally competing strategies, and thus deserves further attention.
Motivation for future research can also be gathered from
coevolutionary games [29], where cyclical interactions can
still be considered as being at an early stage of development.
While initially many studies that were performed within the
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realm of social dilemma games appeared to be valid also for
games that are governed by cyclical interactions, recent re-
search has made it clear that this is by far not the case. The
incentives are thus there to reexamine the key findings, which
were so far reported only for pairwise games on coevolution-
ary networks, also for games that are governed by cyclical in-
teractions. We conclude by noting that devising and studying
cyclic dominance systems with greater practical applicability
and predictive power, including more complex interaction net-
works and larger numbers of competing strategies, should also
be well within the scope of viable forthcoming research.
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